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Abstract
Firms with different ownership structure behave differently. Currently there are three
major ownership structures in China’s industrial sector: state enterprises, collective
enterprises, and private enterprises Market-oriented economic reform has given great
autonomy to firm managers in terms of decision making. Nevertheless, properties are
still owned by different levels of governments in the case of the state and the collective
sectors. This may cause a separation between the function of decision-making and risk-
bearing, thereby inducing firms to pursue the objectives of maximising income per
capita. To understand the behavioural differences among firms under different
ownership structures, this paper analyses firms’ earnings determination behaviour using
a data set comprised of all three sectors. The main findings are that the state and the
collective sectors behave more like Labour Managed Firms, in that they try to maximise
income per worker within the firm instead of profit, whereas the private sector behaves
more like capitalist firms. Further, firms with a higher degree of risk-bearing tend to pay
more attention to their economic and financial performance when making decisions on
how to share profit.
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1. Introduction
Market-oriented economic reform has been under way in China’s urban
industrial sector for about 15 years. The reforms have attempted to change the
behaviour of state-owned industrial firms (SOEs) from central government controlled
organisations to independent, profit maximising firms. Such firms are expected to be
more efficient at allocating human and capital resources and, hence, increase China’s
economic growth rate.
China’s enterprise reform has decentralised decision-making regarding
production and pricing, introduced labour and enterprise incentive systems, and
liberalised the employment system. While these measures are designed to make
enterprises more market oriented, they have not overcome the basic problem
associated with the ambiguous allocation of SOEs property rights. As a result, SOEs
managers usually do not have an incentive to maximise profits. As they identify
strongly with the enterprises’ labour-force and their appointment may be determined
by workers, the managers are more likely to pursue objectives such as maximising
income per capita within the firms rather than maximising profits.
On the other hand, China’s non-state sector, including its collective and
private sectors, is growing rapidly, operates in a competitive market and has
introduced significant competition and efficiency into the economy. The questions
which naturally arise are whether the different types of Chinese firms behave similarly
in the market; if not, which kind of firm will put China’s economy on a sustainable
growth path. This study explores these issues from the perspective of earnings
determination among the different types of Chinese firms as this is a guide to firms’
objective function.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section provides the
background to China’s enterprise reforms and describes the differences in ownership
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3structure among firms. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework of the study.
Section 4 describes the data and model specification employed, and section 5 analyses
the empirical results. The final section gives concluding remarks.
2. Enterprise reform and ownership structure of Chinese firms
Currently there are three major ownership structures in China’s industrial
sector: state, collective, and private enterprises.1 Before economic reform commenced
in 1978, China’s industrial sector was dominated by the state sector. In that year, the
state sector accounted for 78 per cent of total industrial output and 52 per cent of the
total industrial workforce. Due to economic reforms, by 1994, the share of the state
sector in the total industrial output and employment declined to 34 and 32 per cent,
respectively.2 The rural township and village enterprises (TVE) sector has grown
rapidly and by 1994, TVEs accounted for 51 per cent of industrial employment and 42
per cent of national total industrial output. The private sector has grown even faster,
from a very low base, than TVEs in recent years and by 1994 produced 11.5 per cent
of industrial output and employed 9 per cent of the industrial workforce.
Economic reform has not only changed the overall ownership structure of
China’s industrial sector, it has also changed the state sector itself. The state sector in
pre-reform China was owned, managed and operated by various levels of government.
The quantities and prices of output and inputs were all controlled by a planning
committee. Employment and wages were also centrally controlled. Enterprises had
little independent decision-making power.
Following the early success of agricultural reforms in the early 1980s, China's
central and provincial governments have made numerous efforts to reform the state
owned industrial sector. The main focus of the government's initial efforts to improve
managerial efficiency of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was to experiment with
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 State-owned enterprises are those which are owned by the central or local governments. Collective
enterprises include urban collectives and rural township and village enterprises (TVEs). The former are
owned by the urban city or district authorities, and the latter are mainly owned by the rural township
and village authorities. The private sector includes urban private enterprises, joint ventures, foreign
owned enterprises, and urban self-employed. Joint ventures are owned jointly by domestic and foreign-
owners, and the foreign-owned enterprises are owned fully by the foreigners.
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 Total industrial employment in 1978 was 60.8 million and 1994 reached 135million. The gross
industrial output value rose from 423.7 billion yuan in 1978 to7.7 trillion yuan in 1978 and 1994 (State
Statistical Bureau, various years).
4providing increased decision-making autonomy and financial incentives for the
management. In 1979, China commenced experiments with a handful of factories
allowing them to draw up production plans, sell above-plan output to other
enterprises, retain a share of their profits3, promote workers on the basis of their
productivity, control their own welfare and bonus funds, obtain bank loans for
investment, negotiate directly with foreign firms and retain a share of their foreign
exchange earnings. From the beginning of 1981 this so-called economic responsibility
system was gradually extended to all SOEs on an experimental basis.
From the labour market point of view, reform has been implemented rather
cautiously due to the political sensitivity of the issue. Two major reforms of the
compensation system have been undertaken. First, the system whereby a enterprise's
total wage quota was centrally fixed was changed into a "floating" total wage bill
system, which attempted to relate the enterprise's total wage bill to its profitability.
Enterprises were allowed to retain a certain percentage of their profits for welfare and
bonus funds. Initially the ceiling for bonuses was set at a maximum of 5 per cent of
the total payroll, but this ceiling was gradually eliminated. The second step was to try
to link individuals' wages to their productivity. Various types of reform have been
adopted in different regions and industries (Shan, 1991). The most popular approach
is for wages to be supplemented by bonuses, with the level of the bonus set at a
percentage of firms’ retained profit. However, because it is usually expensive to
monitor labour productivity, bonuses eventually became a component of wages that
were equally distributed among employees. Over the reform period, the importance of
bonus payment increased significantly. Table 1 suggests that while the basic wage did
not change much, the share of bonus changed from 2.4 per cent in 1978 to 23.3 per
cent in 1993.
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 Before economic reform, firms’ profit had to be remitted entirely to the authorising government. After
the reform, firms are allowed to retain a certain percentage of their profits.
5Table 1. Changes in the composition of the total wages
in the state sector, 1978-1993
Average wage
(Yuan)
% of basic
wage
% of bonus % of
subsidies
% of others
1978 644 85.7 2.4 6.5 5.4
1980 803 72.4 9.7 14.1 3.8
1985 1213 64.6 14.5 18.5 2.4
1990 2284 55.7 19.1 21.8 3.4
1991 2477 55.4 20.0 22.1 2.5
1992 2878 51.7 22.2 23.8 2.4
1993 3532 46.6 23.3 25.1 5.1
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1994
Although enterprise reform was initiated primarily to give the managers of
state-owned firms more incentive to increase their efficiency, the decentralisation of
decision-making may not necessarily have this effect. This is because the economic
reforms did not change the ownership structure of these firms, nor the soft budget
constraint under which they operated.
In the literature on firm ownership and behaviour, ownership is normally
decomposed into the functions of risk-bearing, the provision of finance and decision
making (Putterman, 1993). It is widely accepted that:
Risk-bearing and control over decision making tend to be associated with the same
individuals because moral hazard means that the cost of risk-bearing is inversely
proportional to the degree of control the risk-bearer exercises over the risks taken
(Putterman, 1993).
The different ownership structures among different type of firms are presented
in Table 2. In the case of a conventional capitalist firm, risk-bearing and decision-
making functions are performed by the firm. In the case of labour managed firms
(LMF)4, the functions of risk-bearing and decision-making are performed by all
employees of the firm. Recently, profit-sharing firms have become very popular in
many western industrialised countries. Its ownership structure, however, does not
differ significantly from conventional capitalist firms, as can be seen from Table 2.
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6Table 2. The ownership structure of different kinds of firms
Capitalist firm LMF Profit sharing Reformed SOEs
Provision of finance
Firm and/or
financial
institutions
Employees
and/or financial
institutions
Firm and/or
financial
institutions
State
Risk-bearing
Firm Employees
Firm and
employees share State
Decision making Firm Employees Firm Managers
The main difference between the reformed state-owned firms in China and
other types of firm lies in the separation between risk-bearing and decision-making in
China’s SOEs. The state bears all the financial consequences whereas the managers of
the firms make the decisions. This separation enables managers of SOEs to pursue
their own objectives.
Under circumstances where risk-bearing and decision-making functions are
separated, the state being the risk-bearer of the state firms, is not able to adequately
monitor decision-making at management level. So long as the managers fulfil the
targeted profit levels (and in some cases also certain output levels),5 they are basically
free to do whatever they like in terms of production, wage and bonus determination.
If the managers of SOEs do not bear the risk of their decisions, the question
then becomes what are the major determinants which define the objective function of
managers in SOEs. As an individual, the manager of a SOE will seek to maximise
his/her utility. As they are not the owners of the SOEs, the yield of the assets is only
marginally related to their own utility. However, as an employee of the SOE firm,
their level of income is an important component of their utility. Another may be to
satisfy workers who work for them through increasing their earnings, thereby making
their management task easier. Thus both the components of the utility function of the
managers in the SOEs, their own income and incomes of the firm’s employees, dictate
that they attempt to maximise income per employee in the firm regardless of its
financial performance. Even if the enterprise incurs losses, as a result of the separation
of risk-bearing and decision-making functions, the firm may go so far as to borrow
money to satisfy employees’ demands for increased earnings.
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7As mentioned previously, although the SOE is still the dominant factor in
China’s industrial sector, the non-state sectors are growing very fast. The difference in
the ownership structure among various types of Chinese firm are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. The ownership structure of different kinds of Chinese firms
Private TVEs Collectives Reformed SOEs
Provision of finance
Firm and/or
financial
institutions
Authorities or
employees
and/or financial
institutions
Authorities or
employees
and/or financial
institutions
State
Risk-bearing
Firm
partial authority
risk and high
managerial risk
partial authority
risk and low
managerial risk
State
Decision making Firm Managers Managers Managers
Urban collective and TVE sectors have roughly the same kind of management
structure as does the state sector. To some extent, they are also supported by different
levels of government. In the case of urban collectives, they may be supported by city
or district authorities; whereas TVE firms are supported by rural township and village
governments. The major difference between the state, collective, and TVE sectors, lies
in the financial strength of their supporting governments. The financial support is
higher for the state sector than that for the urban collectives, which is, in turn, higher
than that for the TVE sector. Hence the hardness of budget constraint that the sectors
operate under is inversely related to the financial strength of their government backers.
In other words, managers in the TVE sector bear the highest degree of financial risk,
while those in the state sector bear the lowest risk.
Given their management and ownership structures, the objective function of
urban collective and TVE firms may, therefore, be also to maximise income per
worker (see also Smith, 1995). However, as they are operating under a harder budget
constraint than the state-owned enterprises, such firms could not afford to maximise
employee income levels regardless of a firm’s financial performance. This should be
especially the case for the TVE sector.
The earnings determination system in collectives and TVEs also follows the
basic wage plus bonus system, though more piece rate wages are paid in the TVEs.
Profit sharing between the firms and their supportive authorities also exists.
8The private firms are basically capitalist firms. They operate in a competitive
market and their objective function is to maximise profit. Firms are decision-makers,
which bear financial consequences.
All of these types of firms, therefore, form a very interesting basis upon which
the behavioural differences of firms with different ownership structures can be tested.
This study intends to test this from the perspective of earnings determination at the
firm-level.
3. Theoretical Framework
Conventional microeconomic firm theory assumes that firms are profit
maximisers. A firm with a primary objective of profit maximisation seeks to employ
labour to the point where the value of marginal product of labour is equal to wages or
the marginal cost of labour, which are exogenously determined. Thus, at the optimal
point, wages are determined by the marginal productivity of labour.6 This may
represent the wage determination behaviour of China’s private sector.
The behaviour of China’s state-sector, as well as the collective and TVE
sectors, however, may significantly differ from this conventional theoretical model.
As discussed above, the objective function of these firms is in fact more likely to be
the maximisation of income per worker. To date, the theory of the labour-managed-
firm (LMF) may be the closest description of China’s state and collective and TVE
firms, where managers of such firms maximise income per employee instead of profit.
7
 The difference between the two kinds of firm lies in the fact that for a LMF, the
functions of decision-making and risk-bearing are integrated, whereas in the case of
reformed state-owned firms, decision-makers do not bear the risk. The degree of risk-
bearing is higher in the urban collective than that in the state sector, and lower still in
the TVE sector.
The analysis of LMFs was first developed by Benjamin Ward (1958), with
subsequent contribution made by Domar (1966), Vanek (1970, 1975, 1977), Stephen
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 Note that even within the neo-classical framework, where wages are given at the market level, average
firm-level wages may vary from firm to firm as each has different levels of marginal productivity of
labour. This may be because firms adopt different technologies and use labourers with different skill
levels, or use different proportion of high skilled workers.
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 The objective function of a profit sharing firm is still profit maximisation.
9(1984), Estrin, Moore, and Svejnar (1988) and Prasnikar and Svejnar (1994) among
many others.
The objective of a firm wishing to maximise income per employee (S) maybe
written as:
Maximise S=(pY-rK)/L=w+π/L (1)
subject to the production function Y=f(L, K) (2)
where S is income per workforce member;
p is the price of output;
Y is the volume of output;
w is the fixed wage per member;
r is the unit cost of capital;
L is the number of employees;
K is the size of the capital stock;
π is the total profit of the firm.
In the short run, assuming capital is fixed, the S is maximised where dS/dL=0,
which implies pY SL
'
= , or pY
L
wL
'
= +
π
. This condition is also true in the case of
China’s SOEs, collectives and TVEs. The only difference is that only a proportion of
profits can be distributed to the firm’s employees as a portion of profit must be handed
over tot he relevant government agency. However, it has been theoretically proven
that this difference does not vary a firm’s behaviour from that of a pure labour
managed firm’s (see Byrd, 1987).
The objective of such a firm will be to maximise:
Maximise S=(pY-rK-grprf)/L
subject to the production function Y=f(L, K)
where grprf represents the amount of profit which must be remitted to the
government. The first order condition will still be pY SL
'
= , where S rt
L
w= +
π
 and  rtπ
represents a firm’s retained profit. When the proportion of a firm’s retained profit is
fixed this condition is equivalent to the first order condition of a LMF.
Although the first order conditions of a labour managed firm (or a reformed
state-owned firm) and the capitalist firms BOTH imply that the value of the marginal
product of labour equals the marginal cost of labour, the components of the marginal
cost of labour of these two kinds of firms differ. The income of employees in
capitalist firms are solely determined by the marginal productivity of labour, while in
10
a LMF firm the employees’ income level is determined by both the market wage level
and profit per capita of the firm. If the two kinds of firms are in the same market, the
income of workers in the LMF will be higher than those in a capitalist firm assuming
that the former firm’s profit is greater than zero. Therefore, the earnings function of
the SOE can be expressed as:8
W=f(w, rtπ/L) (3)
where W represents the average compensation level for the firm, w represents the
market wage level and rtπ/L is the firm’s retained profit per labourer in the firm,
respectively. Assuming that the market wage level is given, the earnings in a LMF is
mainly determined by the level of profit per worker.
If we follow our earlier classification of China’s industrial firms as reformed
state-owned firms, urban collectives, rural TVEs, and privately-owned firms, we may
expect to observe the following phenomena:
(1). Firms’ retained profits should have great impact on changes in income
levels in the state, collective and TVE sectors, while labour productivity may
contribute little in this regard.
(2). On the contrary, labour productivity should be the dominant factor
determining earnings in the private sector, with profitability playing little role.
4. Model specifications and data description
This study examines the impact of economic reform on firms’ behaviour from
the perspective of earnings determination. To test if the determinants of earnings in
the three sectors follows the pattern anticipated in the previous section, a semi-
logarithmic average firm level earnings equation is specified as follow:
lnW
rt
L
MPL region industry year= + + + + + +α β π β β β β ε0 1 2 3 4 5 (4)
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 While many studies investigated the determination of earnings in the LMFs, the emphasis have been
placed on explaining the inter-industry wage earnings differentials (see Vanek and Jovicic, 1975; Estrin
and Svejnar, 1985 and 1993; Estrin et al, 1988). This, however, is not the focus of this paper. Instead,
the main interest of this paper is to analyse the behavioural difference among Chinese firms with
different ownership structure.
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where lnW is average firm level income in logarithmic form, rtπ/L is firm’s retained
profit per worker, and MPL is marginal productivity of labour, which is measured as
value-added per worker. Region, industry, and year are three vectors of dummy
variables. ε is the error term.
Data used in this study is from an enterprise survey conducted jointly by the
National Centre for Development Studies at the Australian National University and
the Institute of Quantitative Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in
1993. The survey incudes data collected for years between 1980 and 1992 for
Guangzhou, Xiaman, Shenzen and Shanghai. These cities are all in the coastal
developed coastal region where there is a high level of market competition from the
non-state sector. There were 288 firms in the survey. As the quality of the data for
1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989 was not good, this study uses only data for 1980, 1985,
1990, 1991 and 1992. By excluding missing or invalid values, the total sample of the
study is 193 firms, approximately 589 observations.9
The 117 state firms accounted for 60.6% of the total valid sample, 12.4%
were urban collectives (24 firms), 6.7% were rural TVE firms ( 13 firms), 16.1% were
joint ventures (31 firms) and 4.1% (7 firms) were wholly foreign owned firms. The
distribution of ownership of the valid sample firms in the estimated wage equation,
however, changed dramatically over time. Figure 1 illustrates the change in the sample
firms’ ownership structures over the period we examined. This reflects the rapid
growth of the non-state sector in the overall economy over this period.
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12
Figure 1. Change of the sample firms’ ownership structure, 1980-92.
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Although one may expect that firms of all five types behave differently, given
the limited number of firms within each category, this study groups the urban
collectives with the TVEs (collectives) and joint ventures with wholly foreign-owned
firms (private). Table 4 presents the mean values and standard deviations (figures in
the parentheses) of all variables we used in this study for each year and ownership
classification. There are several notable features of the data worth mentioning.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Study
Average
monthly
income
Total profit
per worker
Total
retained
profit per
worker
Value added
per worker
Average
employment
(Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) (person)
1980 99.4
(88.6)
2595
(3819)
417
(801)
4663
(4808)
1526
(1588)
1985 145.9
(120.2)
3663
(3686)
1301
(2929)
7353
(6292)
1537
(1890)
1990 227.2
(235.5)
2398
(3562)
1118
(2396)
7660
(7192)
1392
(1878)
1991 243.3
(250.0)
2754
(5162)
1617
(4815)
8620
(9667)
1237
(1667)
1992 297.7
(472.5)
4223
(9661)
1812
(5255)
11293
(16784)
1268
(1875)
State 222.7
(253.9)
2844
(3602)
1266
(3616)
7930
(6151)
1161
(1716)
Collectives 138.9
(74.6)
1418
(2207)
439
(745)
4510
(4438)
596
(1290)
Private 379.4
(667.1)
6644
(2207)
4140
(7706)
20994
(27646)
1221
(2724)
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Over time, the sample firms’ income levels, firm’s retained profit and value
added per capita increased, while the average levels of employment decreased. The
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later is due to the rising proportion of non-state firms in the sample in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Firms’ total profit per worker decreased over 1985 and 1990 due to
the general decline in profits as a result of the entry of many non-state firms which
increased market competition.
Comparing the firms with different ownership structures, while the workers in
private firms had the highest income, their productivity and profitability were also
much higher than that of the other two sectors. The profitability in the private sector is
about twice that of the state and four times that of the collective sectors. Similarly,
their value added per worker is more than twice that of the state and more than four
times that of the collective sectors.
5. Empirical Results
The OLS estimation of equation (4) for the state, collective, and private sectors
separately are presented in Tables 5.
Table 5 OLS estimation of the firm level wage equation
State-owned firms Collectives and TVEs Joint venture and
foreign owned
Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
Constant 4.643 32.69*** 4.363 19.53*** 4.941 23.09***
Value-added/labour 0.019 0.39 0.077 0.82 0.128 5.60***
Retained profit/labour 0.882 10.39*** -1.647 -3.06*** 0.141 1.95**
Dummy for 1985 0.304 3.05*** 0.196 1.41
Dummy for 1990 0.727 7.49*** 0.595 4.25*** 0.167 0.83
Dummy for 1991 0.761 7.76*** 0.595 4.40*** 0.336 1.69*
Dummy for 1992 0.805 8.09*** 0.657 4.77*** 0.389 1.92**
Garment -0.143 -1.28 0.461 2.78*** -0.192 -1.56
Electronic -0.204 -2.52*** 0.200 0.94 -0.178 -1.51
Machinery -0.079 -0.56 0.508 2.03***
Iron and steel 0.130 1.22 0.369 1.30 -0.004 -0.03
Heavy metal -0.844 -3.51*** 0.571 2.56*** 0.722 3.44***
Other -0.130 -1.49 0.392 2.04*** 0.080 0.63
Shanghai -0.050 -0.50 -0.204 -1.44 1.146 4.50***
Xiamen -0.543 -3.76*** -0.662 -4.27*** -0.050 -0.48
Guangzhou -0.188 -1.82** -0.441 -3.03*** 0.052 0.43
Number of obs. 416 119 54
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.37 0.86
Source: Authors’ own estimation
Note: t-statistic values with *** are significant at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent level; *
at the 10 per cent level.
The adjusted R2 is much higher for the private sector equation than that for the
state and collective sectors. Given that the t-ratios for most variables in the private
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sector equation except the value-added are not as significant as in the other two cases,
it is likely that there is a multicollinearity problem in this estimation. Estimation of
correlations between independent variables revealed a high degree of correlation
(0.67) between the two important variables, value-added/labour and retained
profit/labour.10 To understand if this biased our essential understanding of wage
determination in the sector, a variable of total profit per worker and total profit per
unit of total sales are used to replace profit per labour. 11 The estimated results suggest
that value-added per worker would be more important in explaining the wage
variation in the private sector had the multicollinearity problem not existed.12
A simple correlation between earnings and value-added/labour, and retained
profit/labour in the three ownership regimes are calculated (see Table 6). It is found
that the high explanatory power for the private sector equation in Table 5 can be
largely explained by the fact that in this sector earnings are highly correlated to value-
added per labour with the simple correlation coefficient of 0.86.
Table 6. Simple correlation coefficient between log average firm level wage,
profitability and productivity
value-added/L Retained profit/L Profit/L
State sector 0.118 0.443 -0.053
Collectives and TVEs 0.283 -0.037 0.194
Joint venture and foreign owned 0.855 0.511 0.413
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
For the reformed state sector, retained profit per labour is the dominant
determinant of wage variation among firms. Labour productivity seems to contribute
little to wage variation of state firms. These results accord well with the theoretical
model.
The results for the collective sector, however, are very confusing in that one
observes opposite results from what is expected from the theoretical model. Variation
of labour productivity has no impact on wage variation among firms, whereas profit
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 The degree of multicollinearity between the value-added per labour and retained-profit per labour is
very low in the case of the other two sectors. They are, respectively, 0.05 and 0.19 per cent.
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 The correlation between value added per labour and total profit per worker and total profit per unit of
total sale is only 0.12 and 0.08, respectively.
12
 The OLS and the fixed effect results for the estimation with profit per unit total sale and total profit
per worker replacing retained profit per worker in the private sector are reported in Appendix A. Both
results suggest that the dominate effect of productivity on wage variation among the private firms is
very robust.
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per labour affect firms’ average wage levels negatively. This may be caused by an
omitted variable problem. Although some variables which may affect earnings among
different firms, such as industrial affiliation, regional allocation, and time have been
controlled for, firms may have other unobservable characteristics which are important
in determining earnings variations. Models with an omitted variable problem will be
estimated with bias, sometimes dramatically.
To overcome this problem, and to test the robustness of the estimated results,
the feature of panel data is utilised. As a fixed effect model is equivalent to adding
firm dummy variables into the model, the unobservable characteristics of firms will be
captured. Hence, the fixed effect model is considered to be a more accurate estimation
of the true model. Table 7 presents the results of the fixed effect estimation.
Table 7. Fixed effect estimations of the wage equation13
State-owned firms Collectives and TVEs Joint venture and
foreign owned
Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
Constant 4.36 87.03*** 4.25 45.66*** 4.86 30.13***
Value-added/labour 0.07 1.84* 0.03 0.32 0.21 3.72***
Profit/labour 0.20 3.21*** 3.06 3.01*** -0.05 0.36
Dummy for 1985 0.42 7.78*** 0.24 2.47***
Dummy for 1990 0.78 14.87*** 0.47 4.30*** 0.21 1.69
Dummy for 1991 0.86 16.02*** 0.54 5.23*** 0.32 2.64***
Dummy for 1992 0.91 16.62*** 0.57 5.36*** 0.33 2.73***
Number of obs. 416 119 54
R2 within 0.58 0.43 0.72
R2 between 0.15 0.03 0.77
R2 overall 0.26 0.07 0.76
Source: Authors’ own estimation
Note: t-statistic values with *** are significant at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent level; *
at the 10 per cent level.
After controlling for firm specific effects, the fixed effect model provides
estimations suggesting that the results from the OLS estimation are quite robust in the
case of the private and state sectors. However, in the case of the collective sector, the
impact of profitability on earnings changed from negative and significant to positive
and significant. Such a dramatic change may suggest a very flexible earnings
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 The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests and Hausman tests for the three estimations are
reported in Appendix B.
16
determination system.14 However, as the focus of this paper is on firm behaviour, we
may investigate these features in a separate study.
The results suggest that in the state sector, an increase of 1,000 yuan in per
capita profit will increase firms’ average earnings by 2 per cent.15 This figure is 31 per
cent for the collective firms. On the contrary, while profitability contributes little to
firms’ average earnings in the private sector, every 1,000 yuan increase in value-added
per worker will increase wages by 2.1 per cent. This value, although marginally
significant, only affects earnings in the state sector by 0.7 per cent.
Further, as it is understood that most of the reform measures in the state sector
were introduced in the first half of the 1980s, an estimation excluding 1980 may be a
better description of the reformed state sector.16 These results are reported in Table 8.
By excluding 1980 value-added per labour becomes statistically insignificant in the
determination of earnings in the state sector. This result further indicates that by
decentralising decision making procedures state enterprise reform has led the firms to
behave more like labour managed firms than capitalist firms. At the same time, given
the nature of associated ownership structure, income per capita maximisation appears
to be even stronger objective for the collective sector.
So far our results seem to confirm the expectations derived from Section 2.
The earnings in the SOEs and collectives are heavily determined by firms’ profitability
while only labour productivity influences wages in the private sector.
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 Separate equations for the collectives and TVEs are estimated. The results suggest that the changes
mainly happened in the TVE sector. This may be further discussed in another study.
15
 As the data for value added and profit are in 10,000 yuan and firms’ average earnings are in yuan, the
coefficients should be read with these measurement difference in mind.
16
 Separate estimations of average earnings of firms for each year in the state sector suggests that, apart
from 1980, the structures of wage determination are similar over the period. In 1980 neither value-
added per worker, nor profit per worker, mattered in determining firm average earnings, whereas profit
per worker has been a consistent positive determinant of earning variation among state firms (See
Appendix C).
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Table 8. Fixed effect estimations of the earnings equation for 1985-1992
State Collectives and TVEs
Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
Constant 4.79 88.57*** 4.44 48.71***
Value-added/labour 0.06 1.31 0.03 0.37
Profit/labour 0.20 3.03*** 3.99 3.44***
Dummy for 1985 0.36 7.85*** 0.22 2.25**
Dummy for 1990 0.44 9.39*** 0.30 3.18***
Dummy for 1991 0.48 10.34*** 0.33 3.28***
Number of obs. 366 101
R2 within 0.35 0.33
Source: Authors’ own estimation
Note: t-statistic values with *** are significant at the 1 per cent level;
** at the 5 per cent level; * at the 10 per cent level.
How, then, does the behavioural differential affect a firm’s economic
performance? Before investigating this issue, it would be useful to examine the
numerous studies on the performance of profit-sharing firms that have been
undertaken over the last two decades. The empirical findings, however, are
inconclusive (see Weizman and Kruse, 1990). While many studies found that profit-
sharing enhances productivity (see, for example, Bhargava, 1994; Cable and Wilson,
1989, 1990; Kruse, 1992), others found no statistically significant relationship
between the two (see, for example, Florkowski, 1988; Jones, 1987). However,
because the ownership structure of Chinese state and collective firms differs from the
profit-sharing firms analysed in the other studies, it is likely that our analysis will
produce different results.
As mentioned in Section 2, the main difference between normal profit-sharing
firms and Chinese SOEs and collectives is whether risk-bearing and decision-making
are integrated. In the case of profit-sharing, firms are profit maximisers. Hence, it is
more likely that the firms only decide to share part of the profit with employees as an
incentive to encourage employees to produce more (Blinder, 1990). This, however, is
not necessarily true in the Chinese case. For the state sector, the decision-makers are
employees themselves and they do not bear (or only bear of a very limited degree) the
financial consequences of their decisions. Thus, they have all the incentives to share
out profits regardless the enterprise’s financial performance. For the collectives, as
decision-makers have to bear a certain degree of financial risk, financial performance
should be of some concern, and it could be expected that profit sharing would be
linked to workers’ productivity.
18
Table 9. Impact of bonus on productivity changes
Instrumental variable Fixed effect with 2SLS
State Collectives and
TVEs
State Collectives and
TVEs
Coeff. T-ratios Coeff. T-ratios Coeff. T-ratios Coeff. T-ratios
Constant 0.152 0.42 -5.364 -4.22*** 1.363 1.17 -1.519 -1.34
Bonus per worker -0.553 -2.32** 32.981 2.05** -0.584 -1.96** 5.730 2.53**
Educated/total employees -0.042 -0.22 2.292 2.86*** 1.618 3.03*** 1.102 2.47**
log(capital/labour) 0.005 0.10 -0.833 -3.31*** 0.099 1.05 -0.015 -0.10
log(capital/labour)2 0.015 0.60 -0.188 -2.50*** -0.024 -0.64 -0.081 -1.71**
log(labour) -0.071 -1.46 0.405 2.34** -0.350 -2.04** -0.156 -0.88
Dummy for 85 0.141 1.02 0.137 1.32 0.938 3.19***
Dummy for 90 0.245 1.81* -0.245 -0.90 0.046 0.38 0.947 3.12***
Dummy for 91 0.379 2.77*** -0.378 -1.19 0.162 1.24 0.994 3.29***
Dummy for 92 0.505 3.65*** -0.382 -0.86 0.274 1.92** 1.001 3.28***
Garment -0.610 -3.98*** 0.172 0.27
Electronic 0.199 1.86* 0.583 0.88
Machinery -0.401 -1.98** 0.660 1.18
Iron and steel -0.040 -0.29 0.845 1.36
Heavy metal 0.156 0.39
Other -0.005 -0.05 -0.213 -0.46
Shanghai -0.223 -1.45 0.152 0.21
Guangzhou -0.322 -2.19** -1.157 -3.40***
Xiamen -1.235 -4.96*** 0.429 1.07
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.35 0.17 0.76
No. of observations17 265 56 282 67
Source: Authors’ own estimation
Note: t-statistic values with *** are significant at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent level; * at the
10 per cent level.
But, to what degree is the performance of the firm a concern for the state and
the collective firms when they determine the level of profit sharing? This is, by and
large, an empirical question. Following Yao (1995), a CES production function is
estimated to assist in understanding the issue. The basic idea is to test if the bonuses
paid encourage an increase in labour productivity increase. The dependent variable is
value-added per worker in logarithmic terms. Apart from the normal inputs, capital
and labour, bonus per worker and the ratio of highly educated (secondary high school
and above) employees to the total employees are also included in the regression. As
there is a possibility of bonus per worker being an endogenous variable, an
instrumental variable model is also estimated. The instruments used are retained profit
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 The reason that the number of observation is different for the two sets of estimations is because the
estimation for the fixed effect model takes two steps. Hence, the model can predict for bonus per
worker even though the variable has missing value for some observations.
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per worker and average earnings. Together with a fixed effect model,18 the results are
reported in Table 9.
The most interesting result revealed from Table 9 is that the bonus variable
contributes negatively to labour productivity in the state sector but positively in the
collective sector. In other words, firms in the state sector with higher bonus levels
have lower labour productivity than those with lower bonus levels. Whereas in the
collective and TVE sector, the higher bonus level seems to induce considerably higher
labour productivity. This result suggest that with the same income maximisation
objective, firms with a relatively high degree of integrated risk-bearing and decision-
making will share the profit under the condition that this will enhance labour
productivity. On the contrary, in the state sector where the decision-makers do not
bear significant financial consequences, firms will try to share as much profit as
possible, regardless of whether it contributes any increase in labour productivity.19
5. Concluding remarks
In this study, the behavioural difference of Chinese industrial firms is analysed
from the perspective of earnings determination. It is found that both the reformed
state-owned enterprises and the collective sector behave like labour managed firms,
while the private firms behave more like capitalist firms. The major difference lies in
their objective functions. While the private sector pursues profit maximisation, the
state and collective sectors maximise income per employee.
More interestingly the study found that although both the SOEs and the
collectives pursue income maximisation, the former pays bonuses regardless of
whether it induces labour productivity growth. The bonuses paid in the collective
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 The way the fixed effect model is estimated is to estimate the fixed effect model for bonus per worker
equation and get the predicted value for the bonus per worker. This value is then substituted into the
value added per worker equation. This equation is also estimated with the fixed effect model.
19
 Our result is different from Yao’s (1995) finding. In his study, Yao observed a positive and
significant effect of bonus on value-added per labour. One possible source for the difference between
the two studies may be the period under review. The data set used in Yao’s study covers the period of
1980-1987. This is the initial period of reform, one would expect that as the initial level of both
productivity and bonuses are very low, the introduction of reform would have brought great changes to
both variables. This in itself may appear to be the positive correlation of the two variables while, in fact,
they are both the results of the introduction of economic reform. In this study, we mainly concentrate on
the period of 1985-1992. After the initial jump of both productivity and bonus levels, our data set is
more likely to reveal the normal trend of the relationship between the two variables.
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sector, on the other hand, contribute significantly to labour productivity increases. The
reason for this dichotomy is the different degree of separation of risk-bearing and
decision-making. The economic reform has given SOE firms significant autonomy in
managerial decision-making, while their property is fully-owned by the state which
still bears the major financial consequences of firms’ decision-making. This gives the
managers of such firms an incentive to focus on the short-run benefit of their
employees (including themselves) rather than the long term value of the state assets
they manage.
Recent statistics show that China’s state-owned industrial sector is in crisis,
with 40 per cent of enterprises reported to be operating at a loss (World Bank, 1996).
The collective firms operate under relatively hard budget constraints and have to bear
a certain degree of financial risk. Consequently their decision-making with regard to
earnings is more cautious. Greater consideration is given to productivity growth when
bonuses are distributed.
This, of course, is not to say that the collective firms will be as successful as
private firms in terms of achieving long-run economic growth. After all, both the
SOEs and the collectives are income maximisers. By distributing more profits as
bonuses among employees, less emphasis is placed on firm’s need for further
investment and, hence, long-run growth. This suggests that in order to sustain China’s
industrial growth in the long-run, it will be important to encourage a gradual change in
the ownership structure of the state-owned enterprises and collectives as well as to
encourage the development of private sector.
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Data Appendix:
Wage: The dependent variable for the income equation is measured as a logarithmic
form of a firm’s average income level (firm’s total wage bill/firm’s total
employment), where income is deflated by the urban consumer price index.
Productivity: Productivity is measured by firms’ total value-added (deflated by the
industrial goods producer price index) divided by total number of employees.
Firm’s retained profit (total profit) per worker: Firm’s retained profit (total profit) is
deflated by the industrial goods producer price index and divided by total
employment in the firm.
Bonus per worker: Firm’s total bonus bill deflated by the consumer price index and
divided by total employment in the firm.
Regional dummy variables: There are three regional dummy variables in the study:
Xiaman, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. Shenzhen is used as base case.
Time dummy variables: Four time dummy variables are used in this study. The year
1980 is used the base year.
Industry dummy variables: Six industry dummy variables are used, they are, Garment,
Electronic Machinery, Iron and steel, Heavy metal, and other industries. The
Textile industry is used as the omitted group.
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Appendix A:
Robustness of productivity on wage variation
among the private firms, OLS estimations
Constant 4.22 13.19 Constant 4.20 13.06
Value-added/L 0.16 4.89 Value-added/L 0.13 5.47
Profit/L -0.08 -1.49 Profit/total sale -0.02 -0.20
Dummy for 85 1.01 2.90 Dummy for 85 1.01 2.87
Dummy for 90 1.08 3.44 Dummy for 90 1.08 3.43
Dummy for 91 1.14 3.64 Dummy for 91 1.16 3.66
Dummy for 92 1.26 3.97 Dummy for 92 1.26 3.96
Garment 0.04 0.32 Garment 0.06 0.59
Electronic -0.22 -1.92 Electronic -0.19 -1.69
Iron and steel 0.026 0.12 Iron and steel 0.04 0.20
Heavy metal 0.53 2.36 Heavy metal 0.56 2.50
Other 0.25 1.94 Other 0.27 2.17
Shanghai 0.21 1.83 Shanghai 0.21 1.81
Guangzhou -0.26 -2.97 Guangzhou -0.26 -2.98
Xiamen 0.11 0.64 Xiamen 0.11 0.62
Adjusted R2 0.36 Adjusted R2 0.35
Observations 207 Observations 207
Robustness of productivity on wage variation
among the private firms, Fixed effect estimations
Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
Value-added/L 0.135 4.06 Value-added/L 0.109 3.78
Total profit/L -0.043 -1.32 Total profit/Sale 0.058 1.01
Dummy 1985 1.088 6.50 Dummy 1985 1.087 6.47
Dummy 1990 1.050 6.74 Dummy 1990 1.052 6.74
Dummy 1991 1.116 7.13 Dummy 1991 1.121 7.15
Dummy 1992 1.223 7.64 Dummy 1992 1.220 7.60
Constant 4.242 28.51 Constant 4.248 28.46
Within R2 0.49 Overall R2 0.49
Observations 207 Observations 207
23
 Appendix B
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for vi=0:
State sector: χ 2 1516= . *** Prof>chi2=0.000
Collectives and TVEs: χ 2 7 55= . *** Prof>chi2=0.006
Private sector: χ 2 7 92= . *** Prof>chi2=0.005
Hausman specification test:
State sector: χ 2 2 61= .  Prof>chi2=0.856
Collectives and TVEs: χ 2 17 17= . ***  Prof>chi2=0.009
Private sector: χ 2 4 04= .  Prof>chi2=0.544
Coefficient difference between fixed and random effects estimations
State Collectives and
TVEs
Joint venture and
foreign owned
Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Value-added/L 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.14
Retained profit/L 0.20 0.32 3.06 0.02 -0.05 0.09
Dummy 1985 0.42 0.40 0.23 0.24
Dummy 1990 0.78 0.78 0.47 0.52 0.21 0.17
Dummy 1991 0.86 0.85 0.54 0.57 0.32 0.29
Dummy 1992 0.91 0.89 0.57 0.62 0.33 0.32
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Appendix C
Table B. Over time effect of wage determination
1980 Coeff. T-ratios
Value-added/L 0.368 1.58
Retained profit/L -0.985 -0.73
Constant 4.311 40.13
1985
Value-added/L -0.039 -0.46
Retained profit/L 1.106 6.65
Constant 4.709 52.96
1990
Value-added/L 0.044 0.39
Retained profit/L 2.052 7.53
Constant 4.998 48.05
1991
Value-added/L -0.040 -0.41
Retained profit/L 0.716 5.20
Constant 5.234 51.69
1992
Value-added/L 0.148 1.68
Retained profit/L 0.597 4.64
Constant 5.116 46.78
25
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